Anoint Me Please
By: Aidan Kane | September, 2026
By: Aidan Kane | September, 2026
How AI’s hottest private companies are made kings and their investors make paper fortunes
AI the New Cycle
In July 2025, Thinking Machines Lab raised $2B at a $12B valuation. The company was five months old. It had no product and no revenue. What it did have was Mira Murati, OpenAI’s former chief technology officer with a dense roster of researchers and a syndicate that included Andreessen Horowitz, Nvidia, Accel, ServiceNow, Cisco, AMD and Jane Street. Less than a year later, the company was reported to be seeking another round at ~$40B. This round captured the central feature of the market we all now participate in where a private company can move from newly formed to "institutionally inevitable" faster than its underlying business can be observed.
In 2025, just 487 rounds of $100M or more (3% of deal count) absorbed 67% of all capital. In the first half of 2026, mega-rounds captured 88% of U.S. venture dollars.
Many of these companies are comprised of exceptional teams solving incredibly difficult problems. Yet sufficiently large rounds, backed by sufficiently recognizable firms, now do more than reflect progress. They alter the probability of success by attracting talent, customers, compute and attention. I like to call this phenomenon the Anointment Round, altering the competitive facts with prodigious capital.
A History of Kingmakers
Strength begets strength when a well-funded company can recruit a stronger team, secure scarce capacity and give customers confidence that it will survive. Those advantages can produce progress that attracts still more capital. The kingmaker’s wager is that enough strength, concentrated early, can make leadership self-reinforcing.
In medieval warfare, this is known as Lanchester’s square law. This law dictates that fighting strength scales with the square of resources; twice the force has four times the modeled fighting strength. The larger force reduces the enemy’s firepower faster, preserving more of its own. Concentrating resources has always produced an advantage disproportionately larger than the initial difference in size.
In The Art of War, Sun Tzu believes the highest achievement is to overcome an opponent without battle. Applied to venture, the analogy is an overwhelming financing that changes everyone else’s decisions. A talented engineer joins the apparent winner. A customer standardizes on its product. A rival investor decides the category is already spoken for. The money has strategic value before it is spent because others begin organizing around the strength it signals.
SoftBank’s Masayoshi Son, for whom we worked, is a disciple of these philosophies. Across Vision Fund I and II, Son gave his theories an arsenal of $130B and a deal-making army. SoftBank put $5B into Didi and billions more into Uber. He recently invested $60B in OpenAI in a bet-the-company move.
In 1999, Masa invested $275M in Webvan attempting to kingmake before its $375M IPO. At the time of the offering, it had reported only $400K of cumulative revenue and more than $50M of cumulative losses. Its first Oakland facility alone cost about $42M and covered roughly 330,000 square feet, and it attempted to scale nationally with the new capital before proving local economics. Nineteen months after the IPO, it shut down, laid off 2,000 people and prepared for bankruptcy after losing at least $700M. The capital financed the answer before the first experiments could be successfully proven. WebVan (and later investment in WeWork) supplied a warning that kingmaking can change the odds, but it can also quickly reveal how the emperor has no clothes.
Uber's Dara Khosrowshahi summarized the choice neatly saying he preferred SoftBank's 'capital cannon behind me.' The message to a founder was medieval in its clarity. Take the kingmaker's army, or risk watching it march behind a rival… Now it seems the whole VC world wants to anoint winners.
The Pre-Anointment Trade Works!
Across the private market, the trade has created incredible paper gains. LPs, family offices, crossover investors and SPV participants try to enter a prestigious AI company while it is still below $10B or at least before the next tier-one syndicate resets the price far higher. Most LPs reach these companies through co-investments/SPVs, secondaries or funds rather than buying shares directly. Economically, the wager is the same, get access today and anointment will underwrite the next phase soon.
The valuation ladders have rewarded that instinct. Safe Superintelligence went from $5B in September 2024 to $32B roughly seven months later, despite having no public product. Sierra moved from approximately $1B to $4.5B and then $10B within about eighteen months; by the last round, it also reported hundreds of enterprise customers. The same upward curve can sit on top of a research wager or a rapidly scaling operating business.
The pattern is not confined to neolabs or software. Helion (fusion energy) nearly tripled from a $5.4B valuation in January 2025 to $15.5B in June 2026 while still building its first commercial fusion plant. Etched was valued at $5B in December 2025 $10B in July 2026 and $21B less than a month later; the second round arrived alongside its first customer delivery to Jane Street, which also led the financing. Hadrian moved from $1.6B in January to nearly $8B in August as investors funded a national buildout of automated defense factories. In humanoid robotics Figure's September 2025 round priced it at $39B, with only one robot deployed at a BMW factory and no real revenues. The same pattern reaches into insurance and banking. Corgi’s announced valuation doubled from $1.3B to $2.6B in three weeks then $4B in another eight weeks. Erebor reportedly sought an $8B valuation only months after receiving its bank charter. In each case, there is real technical work and real strategic demand. The question is how much of the price reflects evidence already produced and how much reflects the army the new round can now buy.
This strategy has made investors a great deal of money in the AI cycle, at least on paper. So, when each new round arrives quickly and is led by a more prestigious institution, refusing to participate can look more dangerous than participating.
The trade turns indiscriminate when the expected next round becomes the entire thesis. An entry at $15B requires a $45B outcome merely to produce 3x gross and $150B to produce 10x. At that price, the investor is no longer buying conventional venture style convexity. The investor is underwriting the creation of one of the largest technology companies in the world.
The Round is the Product
The anointment becomes self-fulfilling when financial strength converts into operating strength. For a frontier lab, a large round can secure compute and support research programs a smaller rival cannot sustain. For manufacturing, financing can fund equipment and capacity before every production slot is sold. For an enterprise software company, years of runway can reassure a customer making a long-term commitment. Each advantage matters more when it helps secure the next one. Capital attracts talent, talent improves the product, the product attracts customers, and customers make the next financing easier.
Sun Tzu also emphasized concentrating strength where an opponent is weak. The relevant advantage may therefore be narrow with a particular manufacturing process, a distribution channel or access to scarce infrastructure. Anointment works best when the money builds superiority at a point that matters.
Why Anointing Works in AI Too
Frontier models, semiconductor programs, fusion plants, autonomous laboratories, defense factories and robotics do not resemble capital-light software. Large rounds can buy chips, power, fabrication, data, test facilities and time. Capital that funds a measurable training program, a manufacturing run or a deployment can retire real uncertainty. SpaceX remains the clearest reminder that sustained financing can allow a technically improbable company to survive enough tests to become infrastructure and SpaceX did this long before the AI cycle.
AI the New Cycle
In July 2025, Thinking Machines Lab raised $2B at a $12B valuation. The company was five months old. It had no product and no revenue. What it did have was Mira Murati, OpenAI’s former chief technology officer with a dense roster of researchers and a syndicate that included Andreessen Horowitz, Nvidia, Accel, ServiceNow, Cisco, AMD and Jane Street. Less than a year later, the company was reported to be seeking another round at ~$40B. This round captured the central feature of the market we all now participate in where a private company can move from newly formed to "institutionally inevitable" faster than its underlying business can be observed.
In 2025, just 487 rounds of $100M or more (3% of deal count) absorbed 67% of all capital. In the first half of 2026, mega-rounds captured 88% of U.S. venture dollars.
Many of these companies are comprised of exceptional teams solving incredibly difficult problems. Yet sufficiently large rounds, backed by sufficiently recognizable firms, now do more than reflect progress. They alter the probability of success by attracting talent, customers, compute and attention. I like to call this phenomenon the Anointment Round, altering the competitive facts with prodigious capital.
A History of Kingmakers
Strength begets strength when a well-funded company can recruit a stronger team, secure scarce capacity and give customers confidence that it will survive. Those advantages can produce progress that attracts still more capital. The kingmaker’s wager is that enough strength, concentrated early, can make leadership self-reinforcing.
In medieval warfare, this is known as Lanchester’s square law. This law dictates that fighting strength scales with the square of resources; twice the force has four times the modeled fighting strength. The larger force reduces the enemy’s firepower faster, preserving more of its own. Concentrating resources has always produced an advantage disproportionately larger than the initial difference in size.
In The Art of War, Sun Tzu believes the highest achievement is to overcome an opponent without battle. Applied to venture, the analogy is an overwhelming financing that changes everyone else’s decisions. A talented engineer joins the apparent winner. A customer standardizes on its product. A rival investor decides the category is already spoken for. The money has strategic value before it is spent because others begin organizing around the strength it signals.
SoftBank’s Masayoshi Son, for whom we worked, is a disciple of these philosophies. Across Vision Fund I and II, Son gave his theories an arsenal of $130B and a deal-making army. SoftBank put $5B into Didi and billions more into Uber. He recently invested $60B in OpenAI in a bet-the-company move.
In 1999, Masa invested $275M in Webvan attempting to kingmake before its $375M IPO. At the time of the offering, it had reported only $400K of cumulative revenue and more than $50M of cumulative losses. Its first Oakland facility alone cost about $42M and covered roughly 330,000 square feet, and it attempted to scale nationally with the new capital before proving local economics. Nineteen months after the IPO, it shut down, laid off 2,000 people and prepared for bankruptcy after losing at least $700M. The capital financed the answer before the first experiments could be successfully proven. WebVan (and later investment in WeWork) supplied a warning that kingmaking can change the odds, but it can also quickly reveal how the emperor has no clothes.
Uber's Dara Khosrowshahi summarized the choice neatly saying he preferred SoftBank's 'capital cannon behind me.' The message to a founder was medieval in its clarity. Take the kingmaker's army, or risk watching it march behind a rival… Now it seems the whole VC world wants to anoint winners.
The Pre-Anointment Trade Works!
Across the private market, the trade has created incredible paper gains. LPs, family offices, crossover investors and SPV participants try to enter a prestigious AI company while it is still below $10B or at least before the next tier-one syndicate resets the price far higher. Most LPs reach these companies through co-investments/SPVs, secondaries or funds rather than buying shares directly. Economically, the wager is the same, get access today and anointment will underwrite the next phase soon.
The valuation ladders have rewarded that instinct. Safe Superintelligence went from $5B in September 2024 to $32B roughly seven months later, despite having no public product. Sierra moved from approximately $1B to $4.5B and then $10B within about eighteen months; by the last round, it also reported hundreds of enterprise customers. The same upward curve can sit on top of a research wager or a rapidly scaling operating business.
The pattern is not confined to neolabs or software. Helion (fusion energy) nearly tripled from a $5.4B valuation in January 2025 to $15.5B in June 2026 while still building its first commercial fusion plant. Etched was valued at $5B in December 2025 $10B in July 2026 and $21B less than a month later; the second round arrived alongside its first customer delivery to Jane Street, which also led the financing. Hadrian moved from $1.6B in January to nearly $8B in August as investors funded a national buildout of automated defense factories. In humanoid robotics Figure's September 2025 round priced it at $39B, with only one robot deployed at a BMW factory and no real revenues. The same pattern reaches into insurance and banking. Corgi’s announced valuation doubled from $1.3B to $2.6B in three weeks then $4B in another eight weeks. Erebor reportedly sought an $8B valuation only months after receiving its bank charter. In each case, there is real technical work and real strategic demand. The question is how much of the price reflects evidence already produced and how much reflects the army the new round can now buy.
This strategy has made investors a great deal of money in the AI cycle, at least on paper. So, when each new round arrives quickly and is led by a more prestigious institution, refusing to participate can look more dangerous than participating.
The trade turns indiscriminate when the expected next round becomes the entire thesis. An entry at $15B requires a $45B outcome merely to produce 3x gross and $150B to produce 10x. At that price, the investor is no longer buying conventional venture style convexity. The investor is underwriting the creation of one of the largest technology companies in the world.
The Round is the Product
The anointment becomes self-fulfilling when financial strength converts into operating strength. For a frontier lab, a large round can secure compute and support research programs a smaller rival cannot sustain. For manufacturing, financing can fund equipment and capacity before every production slot is sold. For an enterprise software company, years of runway can reassure a customer making a long-term commitment. Each advantage matters more when it helps secure the next one. Capital attracts talent, talent improves the product, the product attracts customers, and customers make the next financing easier.
Sun Tzu also emphasized concentrating strength where an opponent is weak. The relevant advantage may therefore be narrow with a particular manufacturing process, a distribution channel or access to scarce infrastructure. Anointment works best when the money builds superiority at a point that matters.
Why Anointing Works in AI Too
Frontier models, semiconductor programs, fusion plants, autonomous laboratories, defense factories and robotics do not resemble capital-light software. Large rounds can buy chips, power, fabrication, data, test facilities and time. Capital that funds a measurable training program, a manufacturing run or a deployment can retire real uncertainty. SpaceX remains the clearest reminder that sustained financing can allow a technically improbable company to survive enough tests to become infrastructure and SpaceX did this long before the AI cycle.
AI the New Cycle
In July 2025, Thinking Machines Lab raised $2B at a $12B valuation. The company was five months old. It had no product and no revenue. What it did have was Mira Murati, OpenAI’s former chief technology officer with a dense roster of researchers and a syndicate that included Andreessen Horowitz, Nvidia, Accel, ServiceNow, Cisco, AMD and Jane Street. Less than a year later, the company was reported to be seeking another round at ~$40B. This round captured the central feature of the market we all now participate in where a private company can move from newly formed to "institutionally inevitable" faster than its underlying business can be observed.
In 2025, just 487 rounds of $100M or more (3% of deal count) absorbed 67% of all capital. In the first half of 2026, mega-rounds captured 88% of U.S. venture dollars.
Many of these companies are comprised of exceptional teams solving incredibly difficult problems. Yet sufficiently large rounds, backed by sufficiently recognizable firms, now do more than reflect progress. They alter the probability of success by attracting talent, customers, compute and attention. I like to call this phenomenon the Anointment Round, altering the competitive facts with prodigious capital.
A History of Kingmakers
Strength begets strength when a well-funded company can recruit a stronger team, secure scarce capacity and give customers confidence that it will survive. Those advantages can produce progress that attracts still more capital. The kingmaker’s wager is that enough strength, concentrated early, can make leadership self-reinforcing.
In medieval warfare, this is known as Lanchester’s square law. This law dictates that fighting strength scales with the square of resources; twice the force has four times the modeled fighting strength. The larger force reduces the enemy’s firepower faster, preserving more of its own. Concentrating resources has always produced an advantage disproportionately larger than the initial difference in size.
In The Art of War, Sun Tzu believes the highest achievement is to overcome an opponent without battle. Applied to venture, the analogy is an overwhelming financing that changes everyone else’s decisions. A talented engineer joins the apparent winner. A customer standardizes on its product. A rival investor decides the category is already spoken for. The money has strategic value before it is spent because others begin organizing around the strength it signals.
SoftBank’s Masayoshi Son, for whom we worked, is a disciple of these philosophies. Across Vision Fund I and II, Son gave his theories an arsenal of $130B and a deal-making army. SoftBank put $5B into Didi and billions more into Uber. He recently invested $60B in OpenAI in a bet-the-company move.
In 1999, Masa invested $275M in Webvan attempting to kingmake before its $375M IPO. At the time of the offering, it had reported only $400K of cumulative revenue and more than $50M of cumulative losses. Its first Oakland facility alone cost about $42M and covered roughly 330,000 square feet, and it attempted to scale nationally with the new capital before proving local economics. Nineteen months after the IPO, it shut down, laid off 2,000 people and prepared for bankruptcy after losing at least $700M. The capital financed the answer before the first experiments could be successfully proven. WebVan (and later investment in WeWork) supplied a warning that kingmaking can change the odds, but it can also quickly reveal how the emperor has no clothes.
Uber's Dara Khosrowshahi summarized the choice neatly saying he preferred SoftBank's 'capital cannon behind me.' The message to a founder was medieval in its clarity. Take the kingmaker's army, or risk watching it march behind a rival… Now it seems the whole VC world wants to anoint winners.
The Pre-Anointment Trade Works!
Across the private market, the trade has created incredible paper gains. LPs, family offices, crossover investors and SPV participants try to enter a prestigious AI company while it is still below $10B or at least before the next tier-one syndicate resets the price far higher. Most LPs reach these companies through co-investments/SPVs, secondaries or funds rather than buying shares directly. Economically, the wager is the same, get access today and anointment will underwrite the next phase soon.
The valuation ladders have rewarded that instinct. Safe Superintelligence went from $5B in September 2024 to $32B roughly seven months later, despite having no public product. Sierra moved from approximately $1B to $4.5B and then $10B within about eighteen months; by the last round, it also reported hundreds of enterprise customers. The same upward curve can sit on top of a research wager or a rapidly scaling operating business.
The pattern is not confined to neolabs or software. Helion (fusion energy) nearly tripled from a $5.4B valuation in January 2025 to $15.5B in June 2026 while still building its first commercial fusion plant. Etched was valued at $5B in December 2025 $10B in July 2026 and $21B less than a month later; the second round arrived alongside its first customer delivery to Jane Street, which also led the financing. Hadrian moved from $1.6B in January to nearly $8B in August as investors funded a national buildout of automated defense factories. In humanoid robotics Figure's September 2025 round priced it at $39B, with only one robot deployed at a BMW factory and no real revenues. The same pattern reaches into insurance and banking. Corgi’s announced valuation doubled from $1.3B to $2.6B in three weeks then $4B in another eight weeks. Erebor reportedly sought an $8B valuation only months after receiving its bank charter. In each case, there is real technical work and real strategic demand. The question is how much of the price reflects evidence already produced and how much reflects the army the new round can now buy.
This strategy has made investors a great deal of money in the AI cycle, at least on paper. So, when each new round arrives quickly and is led by a more prestigious institution, refusing to participate can look more dangerous than participating.
The trade turns indiscriminate when the expected next round becomes the entire thesis. An entry at $15B requires a $45B outcome merely to produce 3x gross and $150B to produce 10x. At that price, the investor is no longer buying conventional venture style convexity. The investor is underwriting the creation of one of the largest technology companies in the world.
The Round is the Product
The anointment becomes self-fulfilling when financial strength converts into operating strength. For a frontier lab, a large round can secure compute and support research programs a smaller rival cannot sustain. For manufacturing, financing can fund equipment and capacity before every production slot is sold. For an enterprise software company, years of runway can reassure a customer making a long-term commitment. Each advantage matters more when it helps secure the next one. Capital attracts talent, talent improves the product, the product attracts customers, and customers make the next financing easier.
Sun Tzu also emphasized concentrating strength where an opponent is weak. The relevant advantage may therefore be narrow with a particular manufacturing process, a distribution channel or access to scarce infrastructure. Anointment works best when the money builds superiority at a point that matters.
Why Anointing Works in AI Too
Frontier models, semiconductor programs, fusion plants, autonomous laboratories, defense factories and robotics do not resemble capital-light software. Large rounds can buy chips, power, fabrication, data, test facilities and time. Capital that funds a measurable training program, a manufacturing run or a deployment can retire real uncertainty. SpaceX remains the clearest reminder that sustained financing can allow a technically improbable company to survive enough tests to become infrastructure and SpaceX did this long before the AI cycle.
There is also a crucial difference between money that follows evidence and money used as a substitute for it. Anthropic began with a $124M Series A led by Jaan Tallinn, not a canonical tier-one lead and five years later it raised $65B at $965B after building a product and tens of billions of dollars in annualized revenue. OpenAI's $122B round at an $852B valuation came after ChatGPT had created a global market. Cursor raised $2.3B at $29B only after crossing $1B in annualized revenue, then agreed to a $60B sale to SpaceX. Groq climbed from $2.8B in 2024 to $6.9B in 2025 before Nvidia licensed its chip technology and hired its founder and senior engineers in a deal widely reported at about $20B. These are enormous prices, but the money paired with observable adoption.
Venture’s power-law economics reinforce the case. Missing the defining company can be more damaging than overpaying for several failures, and early access to an AI leader can produce exceptional returns. Tender offers and secondaries can sometimes convert those marks into cash before an IPO. This is not an argument that investing before anointment is foolish. In this cycle, it has often been lucrative.
The Challenges of Liquidity, Copy-Trading, and the Need to Underwrite
The While up-rounds are often celebrated, achieving liquidity on a highly marked up company are more rare, namely secondary sale, a tender offer, an acquisition or an IPO. Carta found that more than three out of five funds from the 2019 vintage had distributed no capital after five years. Secondary markets are growing and can create genuine liquidity, but access is selective and sales may clear below the last primary price.
At the end of 2025, 859 active U.S. unicorns were still waiting for an exit. Of those that went public that year, 67% priced below their last private valuation. Until a transaction occurs, paper value may be validated, exceeded or impaired. The investor prays that either the company grows into the price or liquidity arrives in a timely manner.
While top venture firms don't have all the time in the world, they can behave as if they have more of it. Venture partnerships commonly last ten to fifteen years. The largest franchises also have diversified portfolios, reserves, board access, pro rata rights, dedicated liquidity teams and durable institutional LP bases. Their funds are not immortal and their capital is not costless, but they have more ways to hold, defend, tender or roll a position through a difficult market.
The investor following them may have a different clock with annual spending needs, future capital calls, allocation limits, a fund-of-funds maturity, a family liquidity event or simply less ability to wait through another cycle. A company can become an extraordinary business in 2038 and still be the wrong asset for a vehicle that needs cash in 2031. Copying a branded firm’s company selection without copying its ownership rights, information access and duration is not the same strategy.
The anointment round and kingmaking is a permanent feature of the venture landscape and investors would do well to remember errors of the past so they still thoroughly underwrite each investment. Practical discipline is to underwrite four things separately:
- What evidence has the company produced beyond its financing?
- What uncertainty will the new capital retire?
- What scale of revenue, cash flow or strategic value is required to justify the entry price?
- And through what mechanism, on what timeline, can this particular investor realize the return?
Anointment can buy time, talent, attention and the right to take the field. That is the attraction of concentrated force, favorable positioning and a technology that keeps improving. But even a company that wins its market can disappoint an investor who paid too much or cannot wait long enough. Strength may beget strength. Turning that strength into cash, at an acceptable return and on your timetable, remains a separate question.
This communication is for informational purposes only. It is not intended as investment advice, or an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any financial instrument.
While top venture firms don't have all the time in the world, they can behave as if they have more of it. Venture partnerships commonly last ten to fifteen years. The largest franchises also have diversified portfolios, reserves, board access, pro rata rights, dedicated liquidity teams and durable institutional LP bases. Their funds are not immortal and their capital is not costless, but they have more ways to hold, defend, tender or roll a position through a difficult market.
The investor following them may have a different clock with annual spending needs, future capital calls, allocation limits, a fund-of-funds maturity, a family liquidity event or simply less ability to wait through another cycle. A company can become an extraordinary business in 2038 and still be the wrong asset for a vehicle that needs cash in 2031. Copying a branded firm’s company selection without copying its ownership rights, information access and duration is not the same strategy.
The anointment round and kingmaking is a permanent feature of the venture landscape and investors would do well to remember errors of the past so they still thoroughly underwrite each investment. Practical discipline is to underwrite four things separately:
- What evidence has the company produced beyond its financing?
- What uncertainty will the new capital retire?
- What scale of revenue, cash flow or strategic value is required to justify the entry price?
- And through what mechanism, on what timeline, can this particular investor realize the return?
Anointment can buy time, talent, attention and the right to take the field. That is the attraction of concentrated force, favorable positioning and a technology that keeps improving. But even a company that wins its market can disappoint an investor who paid too much or cannot wait long enough. Strength may beget strength. Turning that strength into cash, at an acceptable return and on your timetable, remains a separate question.
This communication is for informational purposes only. It is not intended as investment advice, or an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any financial instrument.
While top venture firms don't have all the time in the world, they can behave as if they have more of it. Venture partnerships commonly last ten to fifteen years. The largest franchises also have diversified portfolios, reserves, board access, pro rata rights, dedicated liquidity teams and durable institutional LP bases. Their funds are not immortal and their capital is not costless, but they have more ways to hold, defend, tender or roll a position through a difficult market.
The investor following them may have a different clock with annual spending needs, future capital calls, allocation limits, a fund-of-funds maturity, a family liquidity event or simply less ability to wait through another cycle. A company can become an extraordinary business in 2038 and still be the wrong asset for a vehicle that needs cash in 2031. Copying a branded firm’s company selection without copying its ownership rights, information access and duration is not the same strategy.
The anointment round and kingmaking is a permanent feature of the venture landscape and investors would do well to remember errors of the past so they still thoroughly underwrite each investment. Practical discipline is to underwrite four things separately:
- What evidence has the company produced beyond its financing?
- What uncertainty will the new capital retire?
- What scale of revenue, cash flow or strategic value is required to justify the entry price?
- And through what mechanism, on what timeline, can this particular investor realize the return?
Anointment can buy time, talent, attention and the right to take the field. That is the attraction of concentrated force, favorable positioning and a technology that keeps improving. But even a company that wins its market can disappoint an investor who paid too much or cannot wait long enough. Strength may beget strength. Turning that strength into cash, at an acceptable return and on your timetable, remains a separate question.
This communication is for informational purposes only. It is not intended as investment advice, or an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any financial instrument.